Mossad Faces Consequences After Colossal October 7 Failure

Mossad Faces Accountability for Failures

The intelligence failure of Mossad on October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched its most devastating attack on Israel, marked a critical turning point in the Middle East conflict. What was initially seen as a monumental failure, exposing cracks in Israel's intelligence infrastructure, has now become a narrative of resurgence. Mossad has not only regained its footing but also redefined its role through the adoption of the Octopus Strategy—a precision-driven, calculated approach to strike at its enemies. 

Mossad’s Failure

Mossad's failure in the recent Hamas attack starkly echoes the intelligence oversights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Just as Israel was blindsided then by Egypt and Syria's unexpected offensive, it found itself similarly unprepared on October 7, 2023. Despite rising tensions, the Israeli intelligence community did not anticipate such a bold move from Hamas. While a last-minute warning came from a Mossad asset codenamed “Angel,” the agency dismissed this crucial intelligence, adhering to its flawed assessment that Egypt lacked the capacity to threaten Israel.

This historical precedent reveals a critical insight: the core issue within Mossad is not the ability to gather intelligence or recognise threats; rather, it lies in the evaluation and response to the information at hand. The agency has repeatedly faltered, not in raw data collection, but in the manage

Mossad Faces Accountability for Failures

The intelligence failure of Mossad on October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched its most devastating attack on Israel, marked a critical turning point in the Middle East conflict. What was initially seen as a monumental failure, exposing cracks in Israel's intelligence infrastructure, has now become a narrative of resurgence. Mossad has not only regained its footing but also redefined its role through the adoption of the Octopus Strategy—a precision-driven, calculated approach to strike at its enemies. 

Mossad’s Failure

Mossad's failure in the recent Hamas attack starkly echoes the intelligence oversights during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Just as Israel was blindsided then by Egypt and Syria's unexpected offensive, it found itself similarly unprepared on October 7, 2023. Despite rising tensions, the Israeli intelligence community did not anticipate such a bold move from Hamas. While a last-minute warning came from a Mossad asset codenamed “Angel,” the agency dismissed this crucial intelligence, adhering to its flawed assessment that Egypt lacked the capacity to threaten Israel.

This historical precedent reveals a critical insight: the core issue within Mossad is not the ability to gather intelligence or recognise threats; rather, it lies in the evaluation and response to the information at hand. The agency has repeatedly faltered, not in raw data collection, but in the management of intelligence—often colored by bias or a failure to grasp the implications of the intel available. 

Although it remains speculative, Mossad likely received prior intelligence regarding the October 7 attack but failed to comprehend Hamas's capability for a synchronised three-pronged assault. Several factors contributed to this miscalculation.

1. Overconfidence in Technology: Israel's reliance on advanced systems like Iron Dome and robust border security may have bred a false sense of security.

2. Normalisation of Arab Ties: Recent diplomatic advancements could have led Mossad to underestimate tensions with Palestine, mistakenly believing the situation was improving.

3. Divided Focus: The Israeli government was preoccupied with unrest in the West Bank and internal political challenges, diverting attention from Gaza.

Moreover, the perception that Iran was focused on nuclear negotiations may have lulled Mossad into a false sense of security, underestimating the potential for Iranian influence in the region. If Iran did indeed back the attack, it would have executed a clever proxy operation, ensuring plausible deniability while distracting Israeli intelligence.

Strategic affairs expert Praveen Swami aptly notes, “successful conduct of war demands endless intellectual creativity.” This sentiment speaks to the urgency of continuous innovation and adaptability in military strategy. 

Mossad: Failures and Comeback

In the wake of the failure to preempt the October 7 attacks, the intelligence agency has undoubtedly engaged in a period of introspection, drawing lessons from its past mistakes—particularly the near-miss of 1973. Following that critical juncture, a commission recommended sweeping organisational changes, which led the agency to develop an analytical framework designed to challenge prevailing military intelligence assessments. The inadequacies of 1973 stemmed largely from a closed feedback loop and a lack of analytical objectivity, factors that left the agency vulnerable to miscalculations.

Historically, Mossad operated under the assumption that Arab states were weak and unlikely to initiate conflict. This same flawed perspective, to a degree, lingered as they underestimated Hamas’s potential for launching a massive offensive. Such rigidity in evaluation and a failure to diversify assessments intertwined fatalistic intelligence practices with national security policies. The shocking reality of the 1973 war shattered these misconceptions, revealing the critical need for a more nuanced understanding of adversaries.

The fundamental tenet of intelligence assessment emphasises that produced intelligence should stem from objective analysis, devoid of biases and prejudices. Mossad's insistence on strong objectivity often compromised its analytical rigour, leading to misguided estimations. As former Mossad chief Zvi Zamir observed, “We scorned them,” encapsulating how the intelligence and policy processes converged to create a breeding ground for disaster. Mossad's superficial assessments failed to adequately scrutinise both the intent and capacity of its adversaries, relying on an inaccurate portrayal of the enemy.

The Agranat Commission hinted at these core issues, highlighting the agency's flawed assessments, yet the problem persisted. The intelligence agency found itself in a precarious position once more following the 1982 Lebanon Invasion, where it faced a complex landscape of intelligence challenges. 

The 1982 Failure

The 1982 conflict marked another significant misstep for Mossad and the upper echelons of the Israeli security establishment. At the time, they believed that a swift military engagement with Lebanon, targeting the Palestinian resistance led by Yasser Arafat, would shift the balance of power in Israel's favor. The attack on the Israeli ambassador in London was leveraged as a critical justification for the invasion. The agency was convinced that their right-wing Christian allies, the Phalangists (Kateeb Party), who were staunchly anti-Palestinian, would provide essential on-the-ground intelligence and combat support.

In its eagerness to forge alliances, Mossad initiated operational collaborations with the Phalangists, underestimating the complexities of their motivations and the extremist tendencies within their ranks. The agency's overreliance on its assessments and advocacy for these allies blinded them to the potential repercussions. This miscalculation culminated in the horrific Sabra and Shatila massacres, where Palestinian civilians and Shia Muslims were brutally killed. The fallout from this atrocity played a crucial role in Israel's eventual withdrawal from Lebanon and paved the way for Hezbollah's secret rise.

The Kahan Commission was convened to investigate the massacre and ultimately held Israel indirectly responsible for the bloodshed. However, the agency escaped any reprimand, while Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was held accountable for his "personal responsibility" in "ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge" and failing to take adequate measures to prevent it. Sharon's negligence in safeguarding the civilian population of Beirut, which had fallen under Israeli control, highlighted significant shortcomings in the broader military strategy.

Reflecting on the situation, Mossad's then-Director Nahum Admoni noted, "The agency tried to the best of its ability to present and approach the subject (of intelligence on Lebanon) as objectively as possible.” He acknowledged that while the agency strived for objectivity, subjective relations inevitably influenced their assessments. This admission exposes a critical flaw in Mossad’s intelligence-gathering process: a limited understanding of the right-wing Christians' behavior and the ramifications of their deployment in refugee camps. 

Fixing the Error and the Octopus Strategy

In the wake of its past failures, the agency appears to be gradually rectifying its assessment errors by adopting a more expansive and nuanced approach to intelligence evaluation, free from prejudices. The agency's recent doings—such as the targeted assassinations of Hamas and Hezbollah leaders and its preparedness for escalating conflicts—highlight three critical improvements in its operational methodology.

First, the agency is now considering a wider array of dynamics and conducting more thorough pre-strike assessments than in the past. This shift away from a limited viewpoint enables a deeper understanding of the complex geopolitical landscape in which it operates.

Second, by allowing for a greater degree of subjectivity and moving away from rigid objectivity, Mossad is becoming more adept at interpreting the delicate balance of power. This careful analysis is a significant departure from previous hasty actions that often led to strategic miscalculations.

Lastly, the implementation of the Octopus Strategy—focusing on precise strikes against high-profile targets—shows a shift in operational philosophy. Instead of targeting the “tentacles” of the threats, this approach emphasises striking at the “head,” reflecting operational and strategic patience.